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Internationally, marine biodiversity conservation objectives are having an increasing
influence on the management of commercial fisheries. While this is largely being
implemented through Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) other management measures,
such as market based instruments (MBIs), have proved to be effective at managing
target species catch in fisheries and reducing environmental impacts in industries such as
mining and tourism. Market-based management measures aim to mitigate the impacts
of activities by better aligning the incentives their participants face with the objectives of
management, changing their behavior as a consequence. In this paper, we review the
potential of MBIs as management tools to mitigate undesirable environmental impacts
associated with commercial fishing. Where they exist, examples of previous applications
are described and the factors that influence their applicability and effectiveness are
discussed. Several fishing methods and impacts are considered and suggest that
whilst no single approach is most appropriate in all circumstances either replacing
or complementing existing management arrangements with MBIs has the potential
to improve environmental performance. This has a number of implications. From the
environmental perspective they should enable levels of undesirable impacts such as
damage to sensitive habitat or the bycatch of protected species of turtles, marine
mammals, and seabirds to be reduced. The increased flexibility MBIs allow industry
when developing solutions also has the potential to reduce costs to both the industry
and managers, improving the cost-effectiveness of regulation as a result. Further, in the
increasingly relevant case of MPAs the need for publicly funded compensation, often paid
to industry when vessels are excluded from grounds, may also be significantly reduced
if improved environmental performance makes it possible for some industry members to
continue operating.
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Introduction
Over the last two decades, the development of international1 and
regional2 conventions to protect marine biodiversity has resulted
in greater commitments to mitigate undesirable impacts in the
marine environment, mostly through increasing the amount
of habitat closed to fishing. For example, the Convention on
Biological Diversity has a global target of 10% of the marine
environment being included in marine protected areas (MPAs)
by 2020. In the USA, legislation is being developed at both
State and Federal levels with this objective (e.g., Hildreth, 2008).
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive3 has a similar goal in
Europe. MPAs are also being implemented in developing nations
for both conservation and economic reasons, such as tourism
and to protect coastal community livelihoods (Francis et al.,
2002). Similarly, a National Representative System of MPAs has
been implemented in Australia with the main goals of protecting
biological diversity and maintaining marine ecological processes
and systems4.
While the non-market benefits of MPAs are potentially
numerous (Angulo-Valdés and Hatcher, 2010) the costs of setting
them up may also be high. Establishing MPAs generally requires
fishing effort to be reduced in the area under consideration,
either through buy-back programs or by the displacement of
fishing effort to other areas (Sen, 2010). While the true cost
of such schemes is often difficult to accurately quantify, it can
be substantial (Dowling et al., 2011). Where fishing effort has
been bought out, this has also often involved publicly funded
compensation for related industries. For example, compensation
payments associated with expanding no take zones from 4 to
34% of the Great Barrier Reef marine park are estimated to
have exceeded $250 million (MacIntosh et al., 2010). Much of
this was paid to onshore businesses that claimed to be adversely
affected by the change (Gunn et al., 2010). Consequently,
identifying policies that can reduce these costs whilst still
achieving management goals is an important component of
developing cost-effective approaches to marine spatial planning
and management.
There is little incentive for stewardship, or to actively prevent
overexploitation, when a species or habitat is not privately owned,
effectively making it a common property resource (Hardin, 1968;
Gordon, 1991). Market-based management measures aim to
create a situation where operators’ incentives are better aligned
with the objectives of management, changing their behavior
to mitigate the impacts of activities as a consequence. In the
context considered here, management objectives may include
reducing protected species mortalities or preventing damage to
1E.g., United Nations Conference on Development and Environment; the
Convention on Biological Diversity; United Nations Conventions on the Law of
the Sea.
2E.g., Convention on the Protection, Management and Development of theMarine
and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region (Nairobi Convention),
Natura 2000 (EU).
3Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine
environmental policy.
4Whilst these reserves are now in place themanagement plans were set aside before
coming into effect as part of the ongoing CommonwealthMarine Reserves Review.
sensitive habitat. This is in contrast to the more familiar fisheries
management problem of preventing the target stock/s from being
overexploited, although the central challenge is essentially the
same in both cases.
If the environmental impact of a fishery can be adequately
reduced by incentivizing behavioral change, marine conservation
objectives may still be met without the need to fully remove
fishing from an area. Potentially, fisheries could then continue
to operate at some level within the bounds of declared reserves.
Behavioral changes that reduce the need to prevent activities
or displace effort also have the potential to reduce the costs
of conservation to both management (e.g., compensation,
administration) and industry (e.g., loss of income, increased
competition on fishing grounds that remain open). If the overall
cost per unit of benefit gained under MBIs is lower than
the alternative (e.g., compensation for the complete exclusion
of vessels from an area) they will also be a more cost-
effective approach. This would allow the cost of achieving
a given reduction in impact to be reduced or, depending
upon the management objectives, greater areas of habitat
or species range to be protected with the same level of
funding.
In this paper, we review the potential of MBIs as management
tools to mitigate the undesirable environmental impacts
associated with commercial fishing and consider how this might
reduce the need to exclude fisheries from MPAs. Where they
exist, examples outlining previous applications of MBIs are
described and the factors that influence their applicability and
effectiveness are discussed. While our focus is on fishing, these
tools are potentially applicable to other industries whose actions
can impact the marine environment in undesirable ways (e.g.,
dredging for port development).
The paper is organized as follows: The next section,
Fisheries Impacts on Marine Environments, outlines some of
the key fisheries impacts that could potentially be reduced
through the use of MBIs. This is followed by the section
Market-based Instruments and Fisheries Management Measures,
which outlines a range of potential MBIs, first considering
measures based on financial incentives before discussing quota
oriented approaches. The discussion section then addresses some
additional factors for consideration and limitations that influence
how these tools may be applied.
Fisheries Impacts on Marine Environments
The impacts fishing can have on the marine environment
are well-documented (e.g., Tasker et al., 2000; Kaiser et al.,
2002). In addition to catching their target species, fishing
vessels can impact non-targeted species, some of which
may be threatened, endangered, or protected species caught
incidentally. In some cases, marine habitats are directly damaged,
while associated ecological communities are impacted through
ecosystem interactions (Hobday et al., 2011). These impacts may
involve species of no direct commercial value but of considerable
non-market value (e.g., iconic and often protected species such as
turtles, dolphins, and seabirds). As the cost of this damage is often
not borne by the fisher, levels of damage are typically greater than
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the social optimum5. MPAs can limit or reduce this damage by
preventing access to areas that are considered to have substantial
non-market values (e.g., large populations of iconic species such
as turtle nesting areas), but in doing so impose costs on fisheries
and management agencies.
The specific impacts that a fishery has, how predictable
these events are, and the frequency with which they occur vary
by fishery and region. For example, in Australia the southern
demersal trawl fisheries have heavier impacts on non-target
demersal fish species and sharks, while seabirds are among
the most heavily impacted bycatch species for the southern
longline pelagic fishery (Table 1). Similarly, the impact on certain
habitats varies with the type of fishing gear being applied. For
example, habitats may be impacted by trawling but not by line
fishing.
The frequency of an impact’s occurrence is a function of the
species or habitat present, the gear used, and how and when
the gear is applied. The type of gear used directly influences
the species or habitats a fishery is capable of interacting with,
whilst the region and season it operates in influences the species
and habitats that may potentially be impacted. MBIs attempt
to reduce overall impact by making fishers accountable for the
consequences of their actions which can influence behavior with
respect to the gear type choice and configuration along with when
the gear is applied. Last, fishers may have limited control over the
degree of uncertainty associated with causing an impact and this
is one of the factors that have a direct bearing on the applicability
of specific MBIs.
Market-based Instruments and Fisheries
Management Measures
Command-and-control measures generally dominate fisheries
management internationally. These include forms of both input
(e.g., gear or effort constraints) and output (total allowable
catches) oriented measures. They are prescriptive by nature,
so tend to be inflexible, not allowing individual solutions to
problems, and are potentially inefficient as a consequence. Input
oriented management measures are typically least favored by
economists, as there is the risk of constrained inputs being
wastefully substituted with unconstrained ones. While catch
and conservation objectives may be achieved in some cases,
these can be at the cost of high levels of inefficiency in
the industry and consequent overuse of resources (Townsend,
1985). In many cases, even the key objectives are not achieved.
Attempts to manage overall levels of target species catch (or
bycatch) in fisheries by limiting effort via relatively easy to
measure inputs such as hooks set or days fished typically
fail as fishers increase their use of non-regulated inputs
instead.
Output measures that focus directly upon monitoring and
controlling the quantities of catch or bycatch a fishery takes
5Such market failure has been identified in a wide range of industries, and is
not exclusive to fisheries. For example, the costs of pollution externalities are not
generally considered by the polluter in their production process. The divergence
between private and public optimum due to externalities has been long recognized
in the economics literature (e.g., Pigou, 1924).
provide greater certainty that management objectives relating to
the fishery resource will be achieved. Further, when catch shares
are individually allocated, they also have the ability to induce
more efficient behavior (Grafton, 1996). For example, when a
total allowable catch (TAC) is allocated to individuals, wasteful
incentives to race to fish are reduced and replaced with individual
incentives tominimize costs. If not constrained by input controls,
output oriented approaches can also result in greater efficiency
by being more flexible and allowing fishers to develop or apply
methods of impact mitigation that work best in their specific
circumstances. The most cost-effective way of catching target
species or reducing impacts will potentially vary between fleets
and even between individual vessels.
MBIs generally work by creating a price (either explicitly or
implicitly) for the use of a non-market resource in the production
process. This price reflects the cost imposed by the activity
and primarily borne by society until then. Requiring operators
to account for this cost creates an incentive to reduce their
impact. In the case of fisheries, these undesirable impacts include
bycatch of non-target species (including iconic/protected species)
as well as habitat damage. MBIs differ from command-and-
control measures in the way that they rely on price signals,
applied at the individual or firm level, to incentivize changes
in behavior and outcomes. They may be applied in addition to
existing command-and-control measures (e.g., ITQs on top of
spatial constraints) or instead of them (e.g., penalties instead of
regulations specifying how and when to operate gear). Where
vessels are heterogeneous in their ability to reduce impacts,
tradable quotas facilitate further efficiency by creating additional
financial incentives for quota to pass to vessels that can use it
most efficiently, working in the same way as ITQs for target
species.
A hierarchy of potential market-based management systems
is presented in Figure 1. Incentives can be created by either
placing constraints on the level of impact fishing activities have,
or by influencing the rewards from fishing. Constraints such as
bycatch quotas are flexible and differ from hard constraints, such
as area closures, as fishers are potentially able to adjust the level of
their individual constraint through quota trading. Non-tradable
quotas are not strictly MBIs, in the sense that there is no market
for them, but they can still create incentives to reduce impact at
the individual level if not doing so would result in vessels having
to prematurely stop fishing (and thus they have an implicit value
associated with them). Financial incentives include the use of
charges, subsidies or bonds. Charges and subsidies directly affect
the returns from different fishing activities, thereby stimulating
behavioral or technological change. Bonds incentivize similar
types of change by providing the incentive for fishers to reduce
their impacts sufficiently below some threshold. The expected
behavioral response varies slightly depending on the type of
policy instrument chosen. Tradable quotas and penalties are
generally anticipated to result in individuals attempting to
minimize the level of impact they create; as fewer penalties
reduces costs and the ability to operate with a low level of quota
either reduces costs or increases income. On the other hand,
bonds and insurances are expected to create the incentive to
ensure that impacts are limited to an agreed level. However, even
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TABLE 1 | Examples of how the frequency of non-commercial bycatch can vary by gear type and region in some Australian fisheries6.
Frequency of occurrence Demersal trawl Demersal longline Pelagic longline Demersal gillnet
North South North South South
Infrequent Whales
Seabirds Turtles Seabirds
Dolphins
Turtles Seabirds
Sea snakes Seals/Sealions Turtles Seals/sealions
Sharks Sharks Sharks Seabirds Sharks
Frequent Other fish Other fish Other fish Sharks Sharks
FIGURE 1 | Hierarchy of market-based fisheries management systems for reducing environmental damage.
in this case there is still some incentive to try and keep below this
limit to avoid accidentally exceeding it.
Previous assessments of MBIs have also included eco-labels
and trade-barriers (Pascoe et al., 2010). However, these are largely
related to fishery-wide behavior and often require additional
management measures to create the individual incentives
required to achieve the desired outcomes. Similarly, when
damages are known or even perceived to occur by the public,
the loss of “social license to operate” may translate into financial
cost in terms of reduced revenues (through lower demand for
the product) and potentially greater regulation or restrictions.
These again require fishery level solutions, but may utilize MBIs
to create the appropriate individual incentives. For the sake of
brevity, these fishery level issues are not considered here.
Finally, to be effective all policy instruments depend on
adequate levels of compliance. A range of factors have been
identified as influencing compliance in the fisheries context,
central to which are economic incentives and deterrence (Sutinen
et al., 1990; Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). Exactly what needs
to be monitored to create a deterrent varies between alternative
applications (i.e., the chosen MBI and the specific impact it is
being applied to) but in all cases it is important that the likelihood
of an impact being detected is high. When this condition is met
MBIs can directly alter the economic incentives fishers face.
6In addition to species specific assessments (e.g., Stewardson, 2007; Trebilco et al.,
2010), the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) Bycatch and
Discard Program is a central source of information for bycatch in Commonwealth
fisheries http://www.afma.gov.au/sustainability-environment/bycatch-discarding/
Financial Incentives
Charge or Penalty-based Systems
In addition to the potential opportunity cost associated with
disposing of bycatch, damage to gear (e.g., from bycatch or
habitat), reduced harvest due to bait and hooks being consumed
by non-target species, or damaged and devalued target species7
are all potential costs of poor environmental performance.
However, as these costs are often relatively small or poorly
accounted for there is consequently little incentive for fishers
to limit their impact when operating. Bycatch and other
environmental impacts can thus be considered unpriced inputs
in the production process.
Placing an appropriate price on these environmental impacts
provides incentives for fishers to modify their behavior (i.e.,
production and fishing effort allocation), and to adopt impact-
reducing technologies that reduce these costs. Where such
technologies do not exist, correctly set charges will encourage
their development. For example, the use of carbon charges
has been seen to influence both energy mix in manufacturing
and total demand by households (Johansson, 2000; Bruvoll and
Larsen, 2004; Tietenberg, 2013). Carbon charges have also been
seen to induce technological change that substantially accelerates
the substitution of carbon-free energy for fossil fuels (Gerlagh
and Lise, 2005). An advantage of a penalty system is that, at least
in theory, different impacts (and species) can attract different
7For example, if fish can be bruised by interactions with bycatch whilst in the cod
end, reducing their quality and value. Crab bycatch can also damage and devalue
target species in shrimp trawls.
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 4 October 2015 | Volume 2 | Article 76
Innes et al. Reducing marine impacts with MBIs
penalty rates, thereby ensuring the greatest protection to that
which is most vulnerable.
Whilst there is no direct incentive to target non-commercial
species, the value of any associated target species can result in
them still being caught, especially if there is no explicit cost
associated with doing so. The potential benefits of monetary
penalties for reducing the level of bycatch of non-commercial
species, particularly megafauna (e.g., seals, turtles, seabirds),
have been demonstrated theoretically by a number of authors
(Sanchirico, 2003; Diamond, 2004; Herrera, 2005; Singh and
Weninger, 2009). Limited examples exist of charges being
implemented on commercial but non-targeted species. Where
applied, it has been with the intention of either encouraging
fishers to avoid the species (Schrank et al., 2003), or providing
a mechanism through which species without quota can be landed
(Sanchirico et al., 2006).
Where fishers are able to avoid non-commercial species and
incidents are observable, a bycatch charge is likely to influence
their behavior and reduce the catch of these species. Similarly,
penalties linked to operating in certain areas will create incentives
for fishers to look elsewhere without permanently locking fishing
activity out of these areas. Given seasonality in ecological systems,
such a charge can be readily adjusted to provide a greater
disincentive to operate in an area in times of high sensitivity
(e.g., spawning seasons), and a weaker disincentive in less critical
times. However, as with many of the policies discussed in this
review, the effectiveness of the MBI will depend on the actual
ability of the fisher to avoid the species or areas of concern.
The implementation of both habitat use and bycatch
penalties requires information on fishing activities and catches.
Historically, these data have been relatively expensive to collect,
due to the need for independent observers on each vessel
during fishing operations. However, the continued refinement of
technology such as electronic monitoring systems (EMS) has the
potential to make it increasingly cost-effective when compared
to observer coverage, and to revolutionize the use of this type of
incentive (Bryan et al., 2011; Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011; Piasente
et al., 2011; Seafish, 2012). Vessel monitoring systems (VMS),
which can track individual vessel location, are now common
among larger fisheries and can provide a means of determining
when and where a vessel is fishing (Witt and Godley, 2007). With
such information, charges can be readily applied if vessels operate
in ecologically sensitive areas.
Penalties are not likely to be appropriate for impacts that are
highly stochastic in nature (i.e., essentially random) as it makes
them difficult to predict and consequently hard to avoid. In this
situation, imposing penalties that are large enough to create a
strong incentive to reduce impact may also result in operators
facing untenable financial risk every time they go fishing. A
further factor for consideration with penalties is that to create a
strong incentive to reduce impact, they would need to be payable
soon after issue. Allowing penalties to accrue increases the risk
of default and diminishes the impact/cost association. From
a practical perspective, this means that penalties are likely to
function better in cases where impacts are reasonably predictable
and infrequent rather than situations characterized by high levels
of uncertainty or high frequency of occurrence, the same problem
Holland (2010) identifies for bycatch ITQs. Impracticably large
numbers of penalties would need to be issued in the latter
case creating unnecessary additional costs for both industry and
regulators, making the measure inefficient.
Direct Subsidies and Payments
The use of subsidies to reduce environmental impacts is limited
in fisheries. Where subsidies exist, these are usually related to
reducing the cost of less damaging fishing gear to encourage
its adoption (Cox and Schmidt, 2006). However, even so called
“environmentally friendly” subsidies can result in increased
exploitation by reducing the cost of fishing (Cox and Schmidt,
2006), and potentially increase total damage as a result.
Payments to individuals to ensure the protection or
enhancement of ecosystem goods or services are an established
market-based instrument for habitat and species protection in
terrestrial conservation (Farley and Costanza, 2010; Muradian
et al., 2010). The potential of such an approach to managing
the impacts of fisheries is still emerging as it requires well-
defined and secure property rights over the good or service
being protected8 and effective enforcement (Bladon et al., 2014).
Critics of the approach also suggest that payment for such
services can undermine the moral sentiments for conservation,
moving it from ethical consideration to economic self-interest
(Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). Gains may also be lost over
the longer term if agreements cannot be maintained over time
and are allowed to lapse. The resumption of dolphin hunting
in the Solomon Islands in 2013 after the breakdown of an
agreement between villagers and a conservation group that had
been providing financial support to develop alternative activities
illustrates this point (Oremus et al., 2015). Whilst the breakdown
of any MBI discussed in this paper will potentially result in
their benefits being lost, the risk of this occurring is greater with
payment schemes as participation is typically voluntary from the
perspective of the provider and not mandated as is the case in
other MBIs.
Assurance Bonds and Insurance
Assurance or performance bonds are economic instruments
commonly used in environmental management (Shogren et al.,
1993; Cornwell and Costanza, 1994; Ferreira and Suslick, 2001;
Bagstad et al., 2007). The aim of the bond is to ensure that the
worst case cost of any damage that remains once an activity
has been completed is covered (Perrings, 1989; Costanza and
Perrings, 1990). This does not necessarily require an upfront
payment9 , and may instead involve a bank-backed guarantee
of payment in the event that the restoration is not satisfactorily
undertaken by those that caused the damage, or damage is
incurred that cannot be rectified. In addition to incentivizing
producers to limit impacts it also ensures funds are available
to rectify any damage once the activity has been undertaken.
Assurance bonds have been used in a wide range of industries
8Well-defined and secure property rights typically ensure exclusivity, durability,
transferability, divisibility, flexible in nature, and good quality of title.
9Some earlier schemes required an upfront posting of the bond, creating liquidity
constraints in cases where the producer could not raise the bond (Shogren et al.,
1993).
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 5 October 2015 | Volume 2 | Article 76
Innes et al. Reducing marine impacts with MBIs
to ensure appropriate environmental outcomes (Costanza and
Perrings, 1990; Cornwell and Costanza, 1994; Gerard andWilson,
2009), including terrestrial based mining operators in Australia
and New Zealand (White et al., 2012) and elsewhere (Shogren
et al., 1993; Gerard, 2000). Bonding programs in the US have
been set up to incentivize compliance with environmental
requirements when closing oil and gas operations. These appear
to have been relatively successful, with non-compliance rates
between only 1 and 9% (Gerard and Wilson, 2009). In Western
Australia, <2% of mining bonds are called in White et al. (2012).
Assurance bonds have a number of perceived advantages.
First, they ensure that sufficient resources are available for
rehabilitation in the case that a firm becomes insolvent before
restoration is undertaken (White et al., 2012). Further, as the
money is already held by the enforcing agency it is up to the firm
creating the damage to demonstrate no net loss, rather than for
the enforcing agency to prove the contrary. Such a shift in the
burden of proof also creates the incentive for firms to research
the future environmental costs of their activities if they want to
challenge the level of bond set by government (Costanza and
Perrings, 1990).
Within the marine environment examples of applications of
bonds are currently limited. One example is the Great Barrier
Reef Marine Park, where they are a key instrument in the
management of approved development activities (e.g., marina
development or associated dredge disposal), requiring either a
cash bond or bank guarantee ranging from $50,000 to $500,000
depending on the scale of the development (Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park Authority, 2010). These funds have been accessed
on a number of occasions to remove abandoned equipment from
activities such as tourism and pearl aquaculture (ABARE, 1993;
Lal and Brown, 1996; Smith et al., 2005). Financial assurance
is also required for oil and gas development in the Australian
marine environment, with the level of assurance based on a
combination of factors, including the type of hydrocarbons, the
potential spill volume and the potential area of shore impacted
(APPEA, 2014). Similarly, offshore renewable energy installations
in the US require a bond to ensure that decommissioning
requirements are satisfactorily met after the facilities (e.g.,
pipelines, cables, and other structures and obstructions) are
no longer required (Hill, 2011; Kaiser and Snyder, 2012).
Comparable arrangements are also in place in most other
countries for offshore energy developments, particularly in
relation to appropriate decommissioning of offshore oil and gas
facilities (Ferreira and Suslick, 2001).
Pascoe et al. (2010) outlined how bonds could be applied to
manage fisheries interactions in the marine environment, with
the bond returned provided fishers achieved a pre-determined
performance target in terms of bycatch rates or avoidance of
habitat impacts. Access to different areas of the fishery could
be subject to different bond levels depending on environmental
sensitivity. Individual fishers could choose to either pay the
bond to access a particular area or fish elsewhere. The bond
creates an incentive to either adopt technologies to minimize
the chance of violation (if operating in the bonded area), or
to avoid the sensitive area entirely (Pascoe et al., 2010). This
provides an alternative to total exclusion, the counterfactual
when implementing an MPA. Less fishing in the bonded area
reduces the likelihood of the adverse environmental impact
occurring, and may also benefit any fishers that remain as less
pressure on the resource has the potential to result in higher
catch rates (at least in the short run). Allowing non-impacting
operators to remain in an area will also reduce the level of effort
that is ultimately displaced to other areas or that requires buying
out.
Monitoring and enforcement of such a system is potentially
challenging. VMS enable identification of whether and for how
long vessels are fishing in a bonded area. However, attributing
any observed damage to individuals is problematic, particularly
if multiple vessels are fishing in a sensitive area at the same
time. While estimates of habitat damage could be derived from
monitoring the amount of time fished in an area and the
particular type of gear, the uncertainty around this is likely to
result in legal challenges if attempts to seize bonds are made
(Pascoe et al., 2010). While fishery level (rather than individual
level) bonds are also an option, these may provide adverse
incentives, as if fishers anticipate that the bond will be lost
through the action of others there will be little incentive to limit
their own impacts (Pascoe et al., 2010).
An alternative to assurance bonds is requiring developers
or proponents of other activities in the marine environment
to insure against the costs of restoration of (or compensation
for) potential environmental damage. A potential benefit of an
insurance-based system is that the risk could be sold on the
insurance market, with industry members paying a premium
to the insurer which reflects the insured’s past performance
and adoption of mitigation technologies (Pascoe et al., 2010).
As with assurance bonds, the aim of insurance is to provide
incentives to avoid damage, as those that are most successful
(through their actions or technologies employed) will face lower
premiums. Insurancemarkets have been used in themanagement
of pollution in a number of countries (OECD, 2003), and
there is generally a mandatory requirement for oil tankers
to have appropriate insurance against oil spills in the marine
environment (Chiau, 2005; Zhu, 2007). Ahvenharju et al. (2011)
found that insurance-based systems were most suitable where
adverse outcomes may involve high costs which individuals were
unlikely to be able to meet, but the likelihood and consequences
of these outcomes were highly uncertain. An advantage of
insurance in this respect is that the cover is potentially open-
ended, unlike bonds which are set at a predetermined level.
In the case of marine interactions, insurance schemes are
likely to be most effective when the chance of an impact is
relatively small (Holland, 2010) and highly observable, but where
the consequences of the impact are relatively significant from an
ecological perspective. In this case the insurance may cover the
costs associated with having to exclude all other vessels from an
area or close the fishery should the impact occur. For example,
when vessels are monitored (e.g., via observers, electronic
monitoring) the bycatch of turtles and marine mammals are
readily observable. They are also potentially more avoidable than
some other bycatch such as non-commercial finfish species. By
and large, most fishers aim to avoid the bycatch of these species,
although there is evidence that different groups within a fishery
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adopt bycatch reducing technologies at different rates (Jenkins
and Garrison, 2013). Lower insurance costs for the use of more
environmentally friendly fishing gear provide added incentive for
their earlier adoption and development.
Quota Systems
Quota systems involve setting a total permissible level of impact,
and are typically employed on the basis that when the quota is
reached the vessel or fishery in question must cease operating
for the remainder of that season/period. These systems impose
a hard cap on the level of impact and can be applied at either
the fishery level (common pool) or to individual operators.
The incentives created differ depending on which level is
implemented. There is a strong theoretical basis for assigning
quotas at the individual level and then allowing them to be traded
between participants as in a well-functioning market this makes
it possible for quota to pass to operators that can use it most
efficiently (Moloney and Pearse, 1979; Clark, 1980; Grafton et al.,
2000). A number of quota based systems have been proposed and
this section considers those based on bycatch and habitat.
Bycatch Quotas
Bycatch quotas are aimed at limiting the total incidental catch
of specific species (commercial or non-commercial). A detailed
review of the advantages and disadvantages of each system in
terms of reducing fishing bycatch has been provided by Pascoe
et al. (2010) so only the key points are discussed here.
There are a number of cases where bycatch limits for non-
commercial species are imposed on fisheries, although these
have mostly been related to bycatch of megafauna, particularly
the more charismatic species. In the US, a total allowable
catch of turtles or marine mammals is in place in several
fisheries (NOAA, 2004), while limits on dolphin mortality in
international tuna fisheries are also common (e.g., IATTC, 2008).
New Zealand also uses output controls to manage bycatch of
Hooker’s sea lions in the arrow squid trawl fishery (Bache,
2003; Diamond, 2004; Chilvers, 2008). In Australia, a seabird
bycatch threat abatement plan relating to bycatch during oceanic
longline fishing operations currently imposes a catch rate limit
(Department of Environment and Heritage, 2006). Whilst not a
quota per se this approach aims to constrain the level of impact
the fishery imposes and when these limits have been reached the
fishery is either closed or substantial parts of its grounds are shut
down (Pascoe et al., 2011). Dunn et al. (2011) suggest that such
spatial and temporal closures in themselves may be appropriate
management measures to limit bycatch of species irrespective of
the observed level of catch.
The unintended economic impacts of common pool quotas
can be substantial and greater than alternative management
approaches (Pascoe et al., 2011, 2013). Abbott and Wilen (2009a)
suggest that such quotas result in a “race for fish” and fisheries
characterized by excessive rates of bycatch, shortened seasons,
and foregone target species harvest, even when efficient (i.e., low
bycatch) fishing gear is used. Delays in information collection
may also make the restriction ineffective. For example, a spike
in the level of demand for swordfish in 2006 resulted in a race
to fish, with a large increase in the number of hooks set early in
the year and the expectation that the bycatch quota would result
in the fishery being closed early (Gilman et al., 2007). Alaskan
bottom trawlers were also observed to have had limited success
at mitigating halibut bycatch when this was managed under a
common pool cap that relied on voluntary cooperation between
vessels to prevent it closing the fishery before the commercial
TACs were taken (Abbott and Wilen, 2010). The introduction of
a formal cooperative that allocated individual quotas for target
and prohibited species to its members was far more successful
at altering fisher behavior though by making fishers individually
responsible for their own bycatch and altering their incentives in
the process (Abbott et al., 2015).
Several authors have investigated the use of individual
transferable bycatch quotas (ITBQs) as a means of reducing
bycatch for both megafauna (Bisack and Sutinen, 2006;
Hannesson, 2006; Bisack, 2008; Ning et al., 2009) as well as fish
species—either commercial (by-products) or non-commercial
(Boyce, 1996; Diamond, 2004). However, relatively few real life
examples of ITBQs can be found, and those that exist are focused
on bycatch of commercial species. In 1996, Canada instituted
an individual vessel bycatch quota (IVBQ) for its groundfish
trawl fleet (Diamond, 2004), while several shark species caught
as bycatch are included in the NZ quota management system.
A system of individual bycatch quotas for US fisheries was
found to be less successful, particularly when total quantities
of bycatch were low and effectively a random event (Holland,
2010). In such cases, individual quota allocations are low and
can result in illiquidity and high transactions costs. A potential
consequence of this is that a fisher who is unfortunate enough
to exceed their quota on a trip may find it costly to source
and purchase additional quota if the unpredictable nature of the
impact results in other (risk averse) fishers being reluctant to sell
due to concerns that they will subsequently need it themselves. In
such cases where impacts are infrequent and uncertain, greater
benefits may be obtained by fishers pooling their individual
quotas, reducing both financial risk and transactions costs for
individuals (Holland and Jannot, 2012).
A potential limitation of quota pools is that the inefficiencies
associated with common pool quotas may arise if the TAC is
reached prematurely as a consequence of moral hazard, where
operators can still benefit at the individual level from racing to
fish (Abbott and Wilen, 2009b). Mechanisms such as revenue
pooling are potential solutions to this issue but can introduce
other efficiency problems due to free riding (Uchida and Baba,
2008). The formation of smaller quota sharing groups, where
participants know one another and there is greater trust, may
be more effective if this social capital incentivizes collaborative
behavior (Pretty, 2003).
Individual Habitat/Spatial Effort Quotas
An alternative quota is the individual habitat quota which takes
the form of an effort control (Holland and Schnier, 2006). These
are spatial management instruments where different levels of
effort penalty are applied based on the level of damage created by
fishing in those areas. These quotas are tradable, allowing vessels
to plan and adjust their fishing activities to minimize their own
damage. Fishers “consume” their quota based on where, when
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and how they fish, with the penalty system providing incentives
to either operate in areas where less damage will be incurred,
or adopt fishing gear that will have a lower impact. Ideally,
such a system would impose differential penalties based on gear
used. Such a system provides an incentive to either reduce effort,
or use more environmentally friendly gear, in sensitive habitats
without the need to impose a total closure. Perhaps the only
current example of this type of measure is the use of Habitat
Bycatch Conservation Limits (HCBL) in the BC groundfish
fishery, which imposes individual bycatch limits for cold-water
corals and sponges. Initial reports appear promising and suggest
that this approach has resulted in management targets being met
as a result of immediate behavioral responses and substantial
reductions in the total quantity of bycatch (Wallace et al., 2015).
While not designed with bycatch in mind, such a system can
also be adapted as a bycatch management system. Modeling of a
variable effort unit system based on fishing location proposed for
an Australian tuna fishery to reduce bycatch of seabirds found
that such a system could effectively control bycatch at lower cost
to the industry than the current area closures (Pascoe et al., 2013).
Discussion
The preceding section illustrates the range of MBIs available as
tools to alter the incentives commercial fishers face to reduce
their impacts on the environment. Whilst examples of MBIs
being applied in this context are still relatively limited in number
and often in their infancy when compared to other industries,
considering the lessons learnt from experiences to date in
conjunction with known practical and theoretical limitations
is informative. The continued movement toward fisheries
management from a broader ecosystem based perspective and
the associated requirements to reduce impacts suggest that the
importance of MBIs in helping realize these goals is likely to
increase into the foreseeable future. Similarly, the adoption of
multiple-use zoning systems in MPAs, where fishing is permitted
in some areas (e.g., Day, 2002; Boyes et al., 2007), demonstrates
that there is a need for more flexible and complimentary
management arrangements to ensure conservation objectives are
achieved.
Whilst transferable quotas are arguably the most familiar MBI
in the context of fisheriesmanagement at this point, their primary
application remains as a means of managing target species
catches. From a theoretical perspective, quotas, and specifically
ITQs, are an economically attractive approach to effectively
constrain undesirable outputs. The level of information and
therefore cost that is necessary for estimating appropriate
penalties to reach a particular quota is likely to be greater
compared to setting a quota and adjusting. However, to attain
socially optimal quota levels or optimal penalties for equivalent
impact reductions, information relating to the full costs and
benefits of impact abatement are necessary. Assuming acceptable
compliance, the primary limiting factor of ITQs resides in their
reliance on conditions that facilitate well-functioning markets.
They are consequently likely to function best in situations where
multiple participants and relatively frequent impacts result in
high volumes of quota and trade.
Poor levels of market participation and illiquidity, limited or
asymmetric information, or the existence of participants with
excessive market power can result in high transaction costs,
insufficient trades occurring and market failure (Farrell, 1987;
Stavins, 1995). In these situations the long-run efficiency gains
potentially available with ITQs will be diminished, preventing an
efficient distribution of quota from being achieved (Anderson,
1991, 2008). Fisheries with ITQs for relatively infrequent and
stochastic bycatch have been observed to be inefficient as
uncertainty creates strong incentives to retain quota, resulting
in thin and poorly functioning quota markets as a consequence
(Holland, 2010). In such cases, greater formal cooperation
between fishers and the pooling of quota is preferable, so that
operators are less dependent on markets but can still access quota
to mitigate risk efficiently (Holland and Jannot, 2012).
The examples provided in the previous section illustrate
how the case specific characteristics of an environmental
damage problem can influence the capacity of fishers to
adapt; these are important factors for consideration since they
can influence the practicality and consequent effectiveness
of particular management measures. The importance of case
specific characteristics is also highlighted by Holland and
Jannot (2012) when discussing the appropriateness of either
individual or pooled quotas but it appears that these factors
often influence the choice of MBI more generally. They list
frequency of bycatch by species, variance and distribution of
events, numbers of events per vessel, whether risk of bycatch
and profit are correlated, whether bycatch is heterogeneous
across vessels, and whether real time information would reduce
bycatch. For example, whilst ITQs may outperform penalties
when impacts are either frequent or stochastic, if impacts are
likely to occur infrequently and have a degree of predictability
a system of penalties will generally be the more appropriate
approach.
Penalties are flexible and can easily be adjusted to meet
management objectives. If desired, penalties that increase with
the level of bycatch or damage can also be implemented,
increasing either progressively or in a stepwise fashion once
defined thresholds are reached. To prevent them being
considered just another cost of operating the level penalties are
set at, or the rate at which they increase, would need to reflect
the severity of the impact. In doing this, minimum levels of
bycatch or damage may effectively be realized at least cost to the
industry. Fishers who do what is possible to reduce bycatch but
occasionally catch some will receive generally low penalties, while
those who do not take measures to reduce their impact will end
up with higher penalties.
For MBIs to be successful, compliance is necessary; if creating
an impact does not result in the charge being imposed, quota
consumed, or bond forfeited, there is no incentive to alter
behavior. Ensuring compliance under systems of payments is
just as important due to the obvious incentives for individual
to try and game the system for their own gain. In most
situations, some form of surveillance is required if compliance
is to be ensured and in many fisheries the most effective way
of monitoring what vessels actually catch has been through
the use of onboard observers. Observer schemes can be costly
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though, and whilst it is possible to require that industry funds
it this might not be practicable in reality. Lack of space can also
prevent observers from working on smaller vessels. Potentially
lower cost alternatives to onboard observers, such as electronic
monitoring may be required and the continuing development of
this technology is making it increasingly feasible (Kindt-Larsen
et al., 2011; Petter Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011; Piasente et al., 2011;
Seafish, 2012). The benefits of this are potentially twofold in that
it could both reduce costs as well as allow vessels too small to
physically accommodate an observer to effectively demonstrate
compliance (and thereby continue to operate in certain areas).
For marine habitats, the use of individual habitat quotas
may be the most effective means of limiting damage inside
marine reserves (other than complete exclusion). These have
the potential to be applied both in cases of undifferentiated
habitat types where impacts are to be reduced, or in patchy
environments where certain habitats need to be avoided. An
attractive feature of this measure is that compliance can be
easily assessed using VMS data, especially in combination with a
video system that monitors fishing activity. A key challenge is to
determine the total level or area of impact deemed as acceptable
over any given period of time (e.g., season/year/indefinitely). If
the ultimate aim is to progressively reduce aggregate impact, the
total level of permissible impact may be reduced over time so
that fishers must either apply less effort in that area or become
more environmentally efficient (e.g., via the development of gears
that result in lower levels of impact per unit of effort applied).
Variants of this type of spatially related effort measure may also
be applied to tackle bycatch when the areas in which the bycatch
occur are discrete and do not overlap the majority of the target
species distribution. A limitation to the gradual implementation
of habitat quotas is in low energy environments, especially the
deep sea, where habitat regeneration times may be measured in
decades or centuries rather than years.
Both penalties and tradable quotas have the potential
additional benefit of raising revenue that can be used for a variety
of purposes, including funding conservation activities. Payments
for the consumption of non-market resources by fishers to other
groups are an alternative approach to offset their environmental
impact. Removing predators has been seen as an economically
feasible conservation action to protect turtles (Engeman et al.,
2002, 2010) and seabirds (Wilcox and Donlan, 2007; Donlan and
Wilcox, 2008; Pascoe et al., 2011), and fishery funded nesting
site protection has been demonstrated to be a cost-effective and
successful means of reducing impacts on turtles (Gjertsen et al.,
2014).
An alternative to habitat quotas is the use of bonds or
insurance that are either forfeited or claimed, respectively, if
predetermined levels of impact are exceeded within a defined
period (again typically a season or year). The level of a bond could
be based on the cost of replacing damaged habitat, the cost to
the rest of the fishery due to these grounds being closed for a
period of time, or both. When critical impacts are likely to occur
in a relatively small geographical area and additional controls
outside these areas are not deemed necessary for conservation
purposes bondsmay be amore appropriate approach than habitat
quotas as these situations are likely to results in low volumes
of quota and trade. A situation that is much the same as how
the management of infrequent and predictable bycatch are better
suited to penalties than quotas.
Concluding Remarks
The focus of this paper has been on fishing impacts as these
are prevalent in the marine environment. However, many
of the instruments considered are also applicable to other
marine industries, particularly the use of assurance bonds
and requirements for appropriate levels of insurance against
environmental damage.
A key message from the review is that no single approach
is most appropriate in all circumstances and that the defining
characteristics of the situation need to be identified and
understood. Characteristics such as frequency of occurrence, the
extent to which an impact may be predicted, and the seriousness
of an impact occurring can then be used to help guide the process
of determining which measure should be most effective. For
example, if impacts occur infrequently and there is capacity to
avoid them then penalties may be efficient; but if impacts are
frequent and unpredictable then this approach is unlikely to
work. Conversely, insurance markets may not be appropriate in
small fisheries due to the limited ability of the insurers to spread
the risk but these may be optimal measures in large fisheries.
It is well-recognized that fishers and other users of the
marine environment respond to the set of incentives created
by the management system within which they operate. Using
this, an appropriate set of incentives can be created that limit
environmental impacts. Real world experience with many of
these instruments is still limited, particularly in the fisheries
context where many examples remain more theoretical than
empirical. However, real world experiences in the absence
of adequate incentives have been demonstrated to result in
undesirable outcomes such as poor environmental performance
or high costs being imposed on resource users.
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